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Introduction 
 
1.  The NATO Advanced Research Workshop entitled "New Scientific and Technological 
Developments of Relevance to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention" was held in 
the National Institute of Public Health, Prague, Czech Republic on Thursday 31 May through 
Saturday 2 June 2001 under the co-directorship of  Professor Bohumir Kriz, Head of the 
Department of Epidemiology and Microbiology, National Institute of Public health, Prague, 
Czech Republic, and Professor Graham S. Pearson, Visiting Professor of International 
Security, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, Bradford, UK.  It was 
attended by 49 individuals from 19 countries, of which 23 came from 7 of the original NATO 
countries (Canada, France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom and United 
States) and 23 came from 9 of the new NATO countries and cooperation partners (Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Ukraine and 
Uzbekhistan) and one from each of Brazil, South Africa and Sweden.   28 of the experts from 
17 of the 19 countries represented either came from government departments or agencies 
which would be involved in or provide technical advisers to the national delegations  
participating in the Fifth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention to be held in Geneva on 19 November to 7 December 2001.   
 
2.   The relevant Article of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention1 (BTWC) 
addressing the review of the Convention is Article XII which states that: 
 
Five years after the entry into force of this Convention, or earlier if it is requested by 
a majority of Parties to the Convention by submitting a proposal to this effect to the 
Depositary Governments, a conference of States Parties to the Convention shall be 
held at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of the Convention, with a view to 
assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention, 
including the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, are being 
realized.  Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological 
developments relevant to the Convention. [Emphasis added] 
 
The workshop was designed to focus on the scientific and technological developments of 
relevance to the BTWC and their implications for the Fifth Review Conference as required by 
the final sentence (in bold above) of Article XII. 
 
                                                 
* This report is based on and developed from material that I presented in the final session of the Workshop 
giving my appreciation of the outcome of the Workshop.   It represents my personal assessment of a lively, 
effective and enjoyable Workshop. 
1United Nations, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, General Assembly resolution 2826 
(XXVI), 16 December 1971. 
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3.   The BTWC requirement that the Review Conference shall take into account any new 
scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention does not limit itself to 
any particular Article of the Convention.  Consequently, the Review Conference should 
consider such developments in respect of all Articles of the Convention.   At previous Review 
Conferences, new scientific and technological developments have been particularly addressed 
in the context of Article I, the fundamental prohibition of the BTWC.  
 
4.   The basic prohibition of the Convention is enshrined in Article I which states that: 
 
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to 
develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:  
 
(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or 
method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for 
prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; [Emphasis added] 
 
(2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or 
toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.  
 
The text above in bold is the general purpose criterion which ensures that all biological agents 
and toxins, past, present and future, are embraced in the prohibition. 
 
5.  At successive Review Conferences, the Final Declaration in respect of Article I has given 
attention to the relevant scientific and technological developments.  It is interesting to 
examine how the language regarding scientific and technological developments has 
developed in successive Review Conferences.  Thus at the First Review Conference in 1980, 
the Final Declaration in respect of Article I simply stated that: 
 
The Conference believes that Article I has proved sufficiently comprehensive to have 
covered recent scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention. 
 
6.  By the Second Review Conference in 1986, the Final Declaration contained stronger 
language and had developed into two paragraphs -- one addressing apprehensions and the 
other making a clear reaffirmation as to the scope of the Convention: 
 
The Conference, conscious of apprehensions arising from relevant scientific and 
technological developments, inter alia, in the fields of microbiology, genetic 
engineering and biotechnology, and the possibilities of their use for purposes 
inconsistent with the objectives and the provisions of the Convention, reaffirms that 
the undertaking given by the States Parties in Article I applies to all such 
developments. 
 
The Conference reaffirms that the Convention unequivocally applies to all natural or 
artificially created microbial or other biological agents or toxins whatever their 
origin or method of production.  Consequently, toxins (both proteinaceous and non-
proteinaceous) of a microbial, animal or vegetable nature and their synthetically 
produced analogues are covered. 
 
7.   At the Third Review Conference in 1991 the Final Declaration contained similar 
language, on this occasion combined into a single paragraph: 
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The Conference, conscious of apprehensions arising from relevant scientific and 
technological developments, inter alia, in the fields of microbiology, genetic 
engineering and biotechnology, and the possibilities of their use for purposes 
inconsistent with the objectives and the provisions of the Convention, reaffirms that 
the undertaking given by the States Parties in Article I applies to all such 
developments.  The Conference also reaffirms that the Convention unequivocally 
covers all microbial agents or toxins, naturally or artificially created or altered, 
whatever their origin or method of production.   
 
8.   At the Fourth Review Conference in 1996 the Final Declaration was broadened, and again 
was in two paragraphs, one reaffirming the scope and the other addressing apprehensions: 
 
The Conference also reaffirms that the Convention unequivocally covers all microbial 
or other biological agents or toxins, naturally or artificially created or altered, as 
well as their components, whatever their origin or method of production, of types and 
in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful 
purposes.  
 
The Conference, conscious of apprehensions arising from relevant scientific and 
technological developments, inter alia, in the fields of microbiology, biotechnology, 
molecular biology, genetic engineering and any application resulting from genome 
studies, and the possibilities of their use for purposes inconsistent with the objectives 
and the provisions of the Convention, reaffirms that the undertaking given by the 
States Parties in Article I applies to all such developments.  
 
9.  The language in the Final Declarations of the successive Review Conferences leads to 
shared extended understandings of the aims and provisions of the Convention which thereby 
strengthen the BTWC regime. 
 
10.  It will be necessary, and appropriate, for the review of new scientific and technological 
developments at the Fifth Review Conference to consider what advances might usefully be 
specifically referred to in the Final Declaration.  This might be done both in regard to the 
reaffirmation of the scope and in addressing apprehensions in order to ensure that there are no 
perceived omissions or exclusions which might be exploited in a way that is inconsistent with 
the objectives and purposes of the Convention.   
 
11.  The Prague ARW was structured to facilitate discussion of the principal scientific and 
technological developments relevant to the BTWC and the ways in which these might be 
reflected in the Final Declaration of the forthcoming Fifth Review Conference.   Each Key 
Speaker was asked to outline the trends in their particular topic area over the past five years, 
forecast the likely developments over the next five years and to identify those aspects with 
significant potential for misuse.   They were then asked whether the language in the Final 
Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference was sufficiently embracing to cover all such 
developments -- and, if not, what additional words or terms should be included. 
 
12.  The workshop had the following main sessions: 
 
Session I.  The BTWC Review Conferences.   The first session set the scene for the 
workshop by outlining the Review Conference process with particular attention being 
given to the way in which relevant scientific and technological developments have 
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been taken into account by the successive Review Conferences.  Another presentation 
examined the background information on scientific and technological developments 
provided by States Parties prior to previous Review Conferences as well as the 
proposals made by States Parties for language to be included in the Final Declaration 
under Article I.  A presentation also looked at the early consideration being given to 
the First Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) to be held 
in 2002-2003 as the requirement in the CWC regarding review conferences includes 
the language that "Such reviews shall take into account any relevant scientific and 
technological developments".  
 
Session II.  Genomics and Information Technology.   A series of overviews were 
presented of the scientific and technological developments of relevance to the BTWC 
in the areas of human genomics, animal genomics, plant genomics, biocontrol agents 
and plant inoculants, microbial genomics, antibiotic synthesis, bioinformatics and 
proteomics.  A final presentation in this session considered the implications of the 
consolidation phase of the genomics revolution. 
 
Session III.  Industrial Biotechnology: The Critical Advances. A series of 
overviews were presented of the scientific and technological developments of 
relevance to the BTWC in the areas of receptors and ligands, advances in immune 
system research, uses of immunomodulators, drug development and design and drug 
delivery. 
 
Session IV.  Issues of Particular Relevance to the Review Conference.   The final 
session was a summary presentation in which a personal appreciation was presented 
of the principal issues of relevance to the Fifth Review Conference arising from the 
Workshop.   This was followed by a round table discussion in which four of the 
participants outlined the issues arising from the Workshop which they had found of 
particular value in looking ahead to the Review Conference.  Finally, Ambassador 
Tibor Tóth, Chairman of both the Fifth Review Conference and the Ad Hoc Group, 
gave an appreciation of the implication of the recent scientific and technological 
developments for the Protocol to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the 
implementation of the Convention.  
 
13.  Overall, the Workshop was particularly timely as it enabled the participants to review and 
gain an appreciation of a wide area of the scientific and technological developments relevant 
to the BTWC and thereby gain a perception as to which developments present particular risks 
to the Convention.  As the Key Speakers completed their presentations by considering the 
language relating to scientific and technological developments in relation to Article I in the 
Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference, participants would be able to make 
judgements as to which developments are of particular concern and need to be brought to the 
attention of the States Parties at the Fifth Review Conference and reflected in the language of 
the Final Declaration.   
 
14.  The spread of participants at the Workshop with about half being experts outside 
governments and the other half coming from government departments or agencies which 
would be involved in or providing technical advisers to the national delegations  participating 
in the Fifth Review Conference was a key factor that made the Workshop especially valuable 
in aiding preparations for the Review Conference and contributing towards shared extended 
understandings and the strengthening of the BTWC . 
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15.  The key points emerging from the presentations and discussion in each of the main 
sessions of the Workshop are considered in turn.   This also shows the way in which the 
appreciation of the participants developed during the course of the Workshop in regard to the 
language that might be incorporated into the Final Declaration of the Fifth Review 
Conference.  
 
The BTWC Review Conferences 
 
16.  The requirement in Article XII of the BTWC is to "review the operation of the 
Convention, with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of 
the Convention, ... are being realized."  Article XII goes on to say that "Such review shall 
take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the 
Convention."   It  was noted that it was important to recognize that at Review Conferences 
there are no changes to the prohibitions and obligations set out in the Convention.   The Final 
Declarations of the Review Conference which are agreed by consensus provide important 
shared extensions of understandings which strengthen the BTWC regime. 
 
17.  The consideration by the Review Conferences of any new scientific and technological 
developments relevant to the Convention applies to all Articles of the Convention.   The 
Workshop particularly focussed on the relevance of such developments to Article I.  This sets 
out the basic prohibition of the Convention under which the States Parties undertake never in 
any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: 
 
(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of 
production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, 
protective or other peaceful purposes;  
 
The language in bold is the general purpose criterion.  
 
18.  The language addressing relevant scientific and technological developments in respect of 
Article I in the Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference stated that:  
 
The Conference also reaffirms that the Convention unequivocally covers all microbial 
or other biological agents or toxins, naturally or artificially created or altered, as 
well as their components, whatever their origin or method of production, of types and 
in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful 
purposes.  
 
The Conference, conscious of apprehensions arising from relevant scientific and 
technological developments, inter alia, in the fields of microbiology, biotechnology, 
molecular biology, genetic engineering and any application resulting from genome 
studies, and the possibilities of their use for purposes inconsistent with the objectives 
and the provisions of the Convention, reaffirms that the undertaking given by the 
States Parties in Article I applies to all such developments.  
 
19.  The first paragraph provided a valuable reaffirmation of the scope of the Convention -- 
that it covers all microbial or other biological agents or toxins, naturally or artificially 
created or altered, as well as their components and is thus a useful extended understanding of 
the language in Article I that states Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever 
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their origin or method of production -- whilst the second paragraph addresses apprehensions 
arising from relevant scientific and technological developments and reaffirms that the 
prohibition in Article I applies to all such developments.  Key language in the second 
paragraph is first the term inter alia which makes it clear that the areas identified are not 
exhaustive and secondly a deliberate lack of precision and the use of broad terms in the areas 
identified.  
 
20.  There was discussion of the close relationship between biological and chemical weapons 
which is shown by the CBW spectrum.    
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It was evident that following the reaffirmation in the Final Declaration of the Fourth Review 
Conference that the BTWC covers all microbial or other biological agents or toxins, 
naturally or artificially created or altered, as well as their components, the CBW spectrum 
should show an even greater overlap between the two Conventions -- with the overlap 
extending at least to include not only toxins but also bioregulators and peptides: 
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This broadening of the overlap was reinforced by several participants noting during the 
Workshop that the dividing line between the physical sciences and the life sciences in general 
as well as between chemistry and microbiology were becoming increasingly diffuse with 
chemistry departments recruiting microbiologists and microbiology departments recruiting 
chemists. 
 
21.  Reaffirmations such as that at the Fourth Review Conference prevent misinterpretations 
or misperceptions that some new scientific and technological developments are not included 
within the prohibition in Article I.   
 
22.   For the Fourth Review Conference, background scientific and technological 
development papers, which varied in length and scope, were provided by seven of the States 
Parties :   
 
a.  Cuba provided three pages of information on the work carried out by nine Cuban 
centres or laboratories 
 
b.  Finland provided a line saying that "she had not made any scientific and 
technological developments relevant to the Convention." 
 
c.  Switzerland provided two pages noting that biotechnology and genetechnology 
had revolutionized (and is still doing so) many areas of biological and medical 
sciences and outlining the developments in recombinant DNA and monoclonal 
antibodies as well as in biological toxins. 
 
d.  The United Kingdom provided 11 pages which provided a comprehensive 
appraisal of the developments of relevance to the BTWC. Separate sections addressed 
detection technologies, genetic developments, vaccines, trends in infectious diseases 
and their treatment, industrial microbiology and microbial control of pests. 
 
e.  The United States of America provided 8 pages which provided a review of the 
technological developments of relevance to the BTWC.  A section on advances in 
industrial application of biotechnology included sections on modified micro-
organisms (with subsections on toxins, peptides), and advances in production (with 
subsections on mammalian cell culture, continuous flow fermenters, hollow-
technology fibre and safety and environmental standards).  A section on advances in 
analytical and vaccine technology included sections on developments in assay 
technology and DNA vaccines.   Another section addressed other technological 
advances including phage libraries and information networks whilst a further section 
on outbreaks of infectious disease included AIDS and Ebola virus. 
 
f.  Sweden provided 6 pages which provided an overview of developments of 
relevance to the Convention.  Separate sections addressed disease causing 
mechanisms, large-scale production, release of genetically modified microorganisms 
in the environment, new antibacterial and antiviral agents, vaccines, and 
identification, diagnosis and detection. 
 
g.  Germany provided a page on scientific and technical progress in providing 
protection from biological weapons. 
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A presentation to the Workshop reviewed the scientific issues which were covered in these 
background scientific and technological development papers.    
 
23.  Some of these background papers on scientific and technological developments include 
value judgements whilst others do not. The inclusion of value judgements about the 
significance of the scientific and technological developments to the BTWC are beneficial as 
they help to better inform other States Parties.   It was, however, noted in the discussion at the 
Workshop that there is rightly no linkage between the information provided in the 
background scientific and technological development papers and the Final Declaration of the 
Review Conference.   The background scientific and technological development papers do, 
however, inform both the States Parties who consult together in putting forward proposals for  
language for inclusion in the Final Declaration as well as the States Parties who negotiate and 
agree the language in the Final Declaration. 
 
24.  In addition to States Parties providing information on new scientific and technological 
developments relevant to the Convention for inclusion in the background paper to be 
prepared to the Review Conference, States Parties also provide proposals to the Committee of 
the Whole for language to be included in the Final Declaration on Article I.    At the Fourth 
Review Conference, such language was provided by two States Parties: Chile proposed the 
following language: 
 
The Conference also reaffirms that the Convention unequivocally covers all microbial 
or other biological agents or toxins, naturally or artificially created or altered, as 
well as their components, whatever their origin or method of production, as well as 
chemical components and products of living organisms and their analogs and 
modified derivatives, whether isolated, synthesized, cloned or produced by any 
combination of means, with a capacity for generating potentially adverse 
physiological effects. 
 
The Conference reaffirms as well that the undertaking contained in Article I applies 
to all relevant scientific and technological developments in the fields of microbiology, 
biotechnology, genetic engineering including all developments in respect to the 
human genome and its present or future applications. 
 
and the United States of America proposed the following language which was similar to, 
although slightly different from, that in the Final Declaration of the Fourth Review 
Conference: 
  
The Conference, conscious of apprehensions arising from relevant scientific and 
technological developments, inter alia, in the fields of microbiology, genetic 
engineering and  biotechnology and the possibilities of their use for purposes 
inconsistent with the objectives, reaffirms that the provisions of Article I applies to all 
such developments. The Conference also reaffirms that the Convention unequivocally 
covers all microbial or other biological agents or toxins, naturally or artificially 
created or altered, whatever their origin or method of production. 
 
25.  As there are now 143 States Parties to the BTWC, there would be benefits to the Fifth 
Review Conference if there were to be more States Parties preparing and submitting 
background scientific and technological development papers than the 7 States Parties in 1996.  
The date for submission of these background papers requested by the Secretariat for the Fifth 
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Review Conference is 15 August 2001 to allow for translation into the six official UN 
languages and distribution to the States Parties.   Such background papers on scientific and 
technological developments can usefully be short papers addressing single issues as well as 
longer papers providing a broader survey. In discussion, it was noted that the aim in the 
background scientific and technology papers is to identify the significant changes and 
advances as such background papers need to focus on what really matters.  More background 
papers on scientific and technological developments will increase international attention at 
the Review Conference and repetition in separate States Parties papers provides valuable 
resonance for the key issues. 
 
26.  The final presentation in the opening session by the Chairman of the Scientific Advisory 
Board of the OPCW (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons) looked forward 
to the first Review Conference of the CWC in 2002-3.  The CWC requirement in paragraph 
22 of Article VIII The Organisation is that: 
 
22. The Conference shall not later than one year after the expiry of the fifth and the 
tenth year after the entry into force of this Convention, and at such other times within 
that time period as may be decided upon, convene in special sessions to undertake 
reviews of the operation of this Convention.  Such reviews shall take into account any 
relevant scientific and technological developments.  At intervals of five years 
thereafter, unless otherwise decided upon, further sessions of the Conference shall be 
convened with the same objective. 
 
In addition, the CWC includes in paragraph 26 of Part IX Activities not Prohibited under this 
Convention in Accordance with Article VI   Regime for Other Chemical Production Facilities 
of the Verification Annex, the requirement that: 
 
26.  At the first special session of the Conference convened pursuant to Article VIII, 
paragraph 22, the provisions of this part of the Verification Annex shall be re-
examined in the light of a comprehensive review of the overall verification regime for 
the chemical industry (Article VI, Parts VII to IX of this Annex) on the basis of the 
experience gained.  The Conference shall make recommendations so as to improve the 
effectiveness of the verification regime. 
 
27.  The CWC is a particularly relevant regime to the BTWC and its Protocol because  of the 
close relationship between chemical weapons (CW) and biological weapons (BW) and their 
overlap in respect of toxins, bioregulators and peptides.   Both the CWC and the BTWC have 
general purpose criteria and both address dual use materials and technology.  There is a 
deliberate overlap between the two Conventions so as to ensure that there are no gaps.  The 
presentation at the Workshop addressed both issues arising from the review of the overall 
verification regime as well as relevant scientific and technological developments.   In respect 
of the verification regime, it was suggested that the present regime is needlessly cumbersome 
for Schedule 2 and 3 facilities although compliance has been ensured.  This view was not 
universally shared.  Insofar as the relevant scientific and technological developments are 
concerned some points identified were the following: 
 
a.  Schedules. 
 
 Are the chemicals rightly placed? 
 Inclusion of new chemicals of concern? 
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 Non lethal agents? 
 
b.  Possible misuses of new scientific developments 
 
Physiological sciences (toxicology) 
Chemical sciences (combinatorial synthesis, biosynthesis, ...) 
 
c.  Relationship with the BTWC 
 
 Toxins 
 Bioregulators, peptides 
 
28.  A particular point noted was the involvement by the OPCW and its Scientific Advisory 
Board of IUPAC (International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry) and thus of the 
national academies of science in the process leading towards the Review Conference.  There 
was, at present, no comparable involvement by the BTWC Review Conferences of the 
corresponding international bodies for biology and biotechnology. 
 
29.  In considering the preparations for the First Review Conference of the CWC in 2002-3, it 
was observed that there is a steep learning curve for the States Parties and for the OPCW.   
As this was to be the first special session of the Conference of the States Parties, 
consideration would need to be given to the duration as well as to the subject matter to be 
discussed.  Insofar as duration is concerned, it should be noted that the BTWC Review 
Conferences have all been of three weeks duration apart from the Fourth Review Conference 
which was deliberately reduced to two weeks as it was held during the duration of the Ad Hoc 
Group to negotiate the Protocol to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the 
implementation of the BTWC: 
 
 
BTWC Review Conference Dates Duration 
First 3rd - 21st March 1980 3 weeks 
Second 8th - 26th September 1986 3 weeks 
Third 9th - 27th September 1991 3 weeks 
Fourth 25th November - 6th December 1996 2 weeks 
Fifth 19th November - 7th December 2001 3 weeks 
 
In planning for the First Review Conference of the CWC, it will be important to ensure that 
adequate time is allocated to carry out the review of the operation of the Convention 
including the relevant scientific and technological developments and not to be sidetracked 
into addressing the routine business of the Conference.    Given the necessity at the First 
CWC Review Conference to also carry out a comprehensive review of the overall verification 
regime for the chemical industry, a three week duration will not be in the least excessive. 
 
30.  Given the close relationship between the two Conventions -- the CWC and the BTWC -- 
there is a great deal that the First Review Conference of the CWC can gain from the 
experience developed over the years in the review process of the BTWC.   It can, for 
example, be seen how the Final Declaration of the BTWC Review Conference has become 
much more confident -- compare,  for example, the language in Article I of the First BTWC 
Review Conference that stated that: 
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The Conference believes that Article I has proved sufficiently comprehensive to have 
covered recent scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention. 
 
and the much more confident reaffirmation of the Fourth BTWC Review Conference: 
 
The Conference, conscious of apprehensions arising from relevant scientific and 
technological developments, inter alia, in the fields of microbiology, biotechnology, 
molecular biology, genetic engineering and any application resulting from genome 
studies, and the possibilities of their use for purposes inconsistent with the objectives 
and the provisions of the Convention, reaffirms that the undertaking given by the 
States Parties in Article I applies to all such developments.  
 
Consideration needs to be given to how best to maximise the benefits to the First CWC 
Review Conference from the experience gained over the years by the BTWC Review 
Conferences. 
 
Genomics and Information Technology 
 
Human Genomics 
 
31.  An overview presentation noted the significant developments in genetics over the past 
century and the following milestones in understanding: 
 
• 1977  The ability to sequence DNA 
• 1997 The ability to sequence genomes 
• 2001 The human genome sequenced 
 
A number of points were noted in the discussion including the following: 
 
 • Several human genes appear to have resulted from horizontal transfer from bacteria 
 • Availability of human genome sequence information 
 • Data about susceptibility to disease is becoming available 
 • Data about the links between genealogy and genetics is also becoming available 
 • Concerns about access to personal genetic information on databases 
 • Ethnic/genetic weapons?  -- possible targeting using disease susceptibilities 
 • Agriculture using genetically identical strains is critically vulnerable to genetic  
  weapons. 
 
32.  The language used at the Fourth Review Conference in the Final Declaration on Article I 
reaffirming that "the fields of microbiology, biotechnology, molecular biology, genetic 
engineering and any application resulting from genome studies," were all embraced in the 
Article I prohibition was discussed in the light of the discussion.   As the term 'proteome' is  
broader than 'genome', it was suggested that there could be benefit from an extension to read 
"any application resulting from genome and proteome studies,".   Consideration was also 
given to whether the language any application resulting from genome studies was broad 
enough to include production.  There was also consideration as to whether there would be 
benefit in including in this reaffirmation the words "in animals and plants as well as humans" 
thereby underlining the application to animals and plants -- as their vulnerability to deliberate 
disease might be considered greater than that of humans. 
 
Animal Genomics 
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33.  A presentation addressed the advances in genomics and prion science in respect of 
animal disease.   It was observed that as more genomes are sequenced, so the potential uses 
for genomics will increase.  In addition, as the functions of more proteins are solved, then it 
will be easier to better predict what an unknown protein does just by its sequence.   The 
developments in prion science were also addressed particularly in the context of BSE and its 
relationship with nvCJD.   It was noted that the BSE prion is heat and UV resistant and 
extremely stable in storage;  it is easy to produce and multiply and has an LD50 of 5 
femtograms.  As it is a simple protein, it could possibly be made synthetically.   In the context 
of the BTWC, it was observed that because there in no reliable test to detect pre-
symptomatic, BSE infected cattle while alive, it could be hard to distinguish a well 
orchestrated hoax from an actual attack -- and both could have devastating economic 
consequences for the beef industry which in the USA has an annual value of some $50 
billion. 
 
34.  Given the reaffirmation in the Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference that: 
 
The Conference also reaffirms that the Convention unequivocally covers all microbial 
or other biological agents or toxins, naturally or artificially created or altered, as 
well as their components, whatever their origin or method of production, of types and 
in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful 
purposes.  
 
it is clear that prions are included within the language all microbial or other biological agents 
or toxins, naturally or artificially created or altered, as well as their components.   They are 
also included within the Chemical Weapons Convention.   There could be advantage at the 
Fifth Review Conference in following the approach adopted in the Final Declaration of the 
Second Review Conference when the first reaffirmation sentence was followed by a second 
explanatory sentence: 
 
The Conference reaffirms that the Convention unequivocally applies to all natural or 
artificially created microbial or other biological agents or toxins whatever their 
origin or method of production.  Consequently, toxins (both proteinaceous and non-
proteinaceous) of a microbial, animal or vegetable nature and their synthetically 
produced analogues are covered. 
 
35.  Consequently, language in the Final Declaration at the Fifth Review Conference could 
usefully have the same first reaffirmation sentence followed by a second explanatory 
sentence along the following lines: 
 
The Conference also reaffirms that the Convention unequivocally covers all microbial 
or other biological agents or toxins, naturally or artificially created or altered, as 
well as their components, whatever their origin or method of production, of types and 
in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful 
purposes. Consequently, prions and their synthetically produced analogues are 
covered. 
 
Plant Genomics 
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36.   In this session, a presentation outlined developments in plant genomics and went on 
more generally to note that novel techniques included: nanobiotechnology; biorobotics; DNA 
- computing; and DNA - computational intelligence.  In considering the relationship of such 
developments to international relationships, the Biosafety Protocol and the BTWC were both 
considered and attention was drawn to the possible value of "soft law" -- the establishment of 
professional standards to avoid misuse of advances.  As always, the intent of the work is 
crucial in determining whether it is prohibited by the BTWC or not.  The question of "intent" 
was discussed on several occasions during the Workshop -- each particular case needed to be 
addressed on its individual merits and the types and quantities as well as the purpose of the 
work needed to be consistent with and justified for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful 
purposes.  There was general agreement that it was important to involve the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) in considerations of developments in plant genomics 
although this seemed to be difficult to achieve.  The importance of States Parties adopting 
national implementation measures -- such as legislation -- under Article IV of the BTWC to 
legally prohibit work on biological weapons was vital as such legislation applied to all 
individuals within that State. 
 
Biocontrol Agents and Plant Inoculants 
 
37.  An overview was first presented of plant inoculants -- formulations containing pure or 
predetermined mixtures of living microorganisms for the treatment of seed, seedlings or other 
plant propagation material for the purpose of enhancing the growth capabilities or disease 
resistance of the eventual plants or crops.   The methods of inoculation as well as the methods 
of production of plant inoculants were outlined.   It was evident that production facilities and 
application methods could be relevant to the BTWC.   
 
38.  Biological control was then surveyed.  This was a field that had developed fast over the 
past 10 years.   Biocontrol agents could be regarded as being a living organism or a 
biologically active substance originated from such an organism, used for the prevention, 
elimination or reduction of plant diseases, pests or unwanted plants.   The past decade had 
seen increased effectiveness of biocontrol agents as well as increased production and more 
effective means of application.   The need for closer scrutiny and control of biocontrol agents 
was recognised on a number of grounds:  biocontrol agents were not always as specific as was 
desired; biocontrol agents may have undesired (and unforeseen) effects;  and undesired plants 
in one country may be required in another country.  Insofar as relevance to the BTWC is 
concerned, the use of biocontrol agents when used by a State within its own territory would 
be legal, whilst use against the territory of another State without the agreement of that State 
would be illegal.  It would be important for a State using biocontrol agents within its own 
territory to take reasonable precautions to ensure that such use did not inadvertently spread 
outside its own territory. 
 
39.  In respect of the Fifth Review Conference, it was evident that there would be advantage 
in extending the existing Confidence-Building Measure G which requires States to submit 
information on vaccine production facilities to be extended so as to also require the 
submission of information on plant inoculant production facilities and biocontrol production 
facilities.  This raises the question of the ability of the States Parties to gather the relevant 
information without the need for primary legislation.  In the context of the Final Declaration 
under Article I, there would be advantage in including "biological control" in the listing of 
technologies in the 'apprehensions' paragraph which might read as follows: 
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The Conference, conscious of apprehensions arising from relevant scientific and 
technological developments, inter alia, in the fields of microbiology, biotechnology, 
molecular biology, genetic engineering and any application resulting from genome 
studies, and biological control and the possibilities of their use for purposes 
inconsistent with the objectives and the provisions of the Convention, reaffirms that 
the undertaking given by the States Parties in Article I applies to all such 
developments.  
 
The broader term "biological control" is deliberately used rather than the more limited 
"biocontrol agents". 
 
Microbial Genomics 
 
40.  An overview of developments was presented which examined recent trends and likely 
future developments in microbial genomics, microbial pathogenicity and microbial 
epidemiology.    It was noted that some 46 organisms, many of which were microorganisms, 
had been completely sequenced by April 2001 and that, in April 2001, a further 159 were 
currently in progress which included several microorganisms that had traditionally been 
regarded as biological weapon agents (such as anthrax, tularemia and plague).  There was 
immense effort going into the collection of data.   It was also evident that the understanding 
of the way in which humans live together with bacteria would increase greatly.  The 
molecular basis of life and disease would be better understood.  It was probable that new 
diseases would emerge.   Molecular epidemiology would also develop significantly bringing 
understandings of the contribution of potential genetic and environmental risk factors, 
identified at the molecular level, to the etiology, distribution and prevention of disease within 
families and across populations.   There was thus a clear move towards functional genomics 
and proteomics.  In the discussion, the relevance of such advances to the BTWC was 
discussed ranging from considerations of what research should be carried out -- or not -- and 
how international level playing fields could be achieved through the potential or otherwise for 
genetic weapons. 
 
41.  Insofar as the Final Declaration of the Fifth Review Conference was concerned, it was 
suggested that the term "and derived techniques" could usefully be added to the 
'apprehensions' paragraph so that it would read: 
 
The Conference, conscious of apprehensions arising from relevant scientific and 
technological developments, inter alia, in the fields of microbiology, biotechnology, 
molecular biology, genetic engineering and any application resulting from genome 
studies and derived techniques, and the possibilities of their use for purposes 
inconsistent with the objectives and the provisions of the Convention, reaffirms that 
the undertaking given by the States Parties in Article I applies to all such 
developments.  
 
Antibiotic Synthesis 
 
42.  A presentation on the genetic and biochemical control of antibiotic synthesis recognised 
that there are today more than 30 new infectious diseases that were unknown 20 years ago 
and that the widespread use of antibiotics has resulted in a rapid spread of multi-drug resistant 
pathogens which has become both a local and a global health problem.  Production of new 
biologically active compounds by genetically modified organisms was developing rapidly and 
new antibiotics and drugs were being developed.  Insofar as the Final Declaration of the Fifth 
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Review Conference is concerned, it was considered that the language in the 'apprehensions' 
paragraph of the Fourth Review Conference adequately embraced the likely developments. 
 
Bioinformatics 
 
43.  The application of information technology to the biological sciences in general and to 
genomics and proteomics in particular was less than 10 years old and was developing rapidly.  
It was recognised that bioinformatics represented an unstoppable force with an increasing 
speed of change.   It was noted that there was probably about three times as much 
bioinformatics data in private databases than there was in public databases.  In discussion, 
concern was expressed that the bench scientist was becoming more and more remote from 
experimental data -- and was becoming a hostage to the software in the bioinformatics 
packages and the way in which that software manipulated the data. 
 
44.  In the context of the Fifth Review Conference, two points emerged from discussion.  
First, was the rate of change so rapid that five yearly Review Conferences were too 
infrequent?  If this was so, then the proposals made by Nicholas Sims2 for interim supportive 
institutions for the BTWC comprising of a Committee of Oversight supported by a Scientific 
as well as a Legal Advisory Panel could provide a good solution.   The second point related to 
the clear need to protect databases from inappropriate use.   This could be achieved by 
appropriate language in the Final Declaration of the Fifth Review Conference in respect of 
several of the Articles: 
 
a.  Article I.   In respect of the reaffirmation of the basic prohibition, the term 
"bioinformatics" might, for example, be included in the 'apprehensions' paragraph. 
 
b.  Article III.   This Article requires that: 
 
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to transfer to any recipient 
whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or 
induce any State, group of States or international organizations to 
manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, 
equipment or means of delivery specified in article I of this Convention.  
 
The Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference included the language that 
"Article III is sufficiently comprehensive to cover any recipient whatsoever at 
international, national or subnational levels."  It is also clear that some States Parties 
such as the UK and the members of the European Union are taking moves to control 
intangible technology transfers and thereby strengthening their implementation of 
Article III. 
 
c.  Article IV.  This Article requires that: 
 
Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its 
constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent 
the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of the 
agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in article I 
                                                 
2Nicholas A. Sims, The Functions of the BTWC Review Conferences: Maximizing the Benefits from the Fifth 
Review Conference, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Review Conference Paper No. 2, 
April 2001.  Available at http:// www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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of the Convention, within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or 
under its control anywhere. 
 
The Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference included the language that 
"The States Parties recognize the need to ensure...the effective fulfilment of their 
obligations under the Convention in order, inter alia, to exclude use of biological and 
toxin weapons in terrorist or criminal activity."   Language at the Fifth Review 
Conference could extend this to address the protection of databases from abuse. 
  
Proteomics 
 
45.    An overview of proteomics set this in the overall context of the relationship between 
genomics and DNA where the sequence of bases in the DNA encodes the sequence of amino 
acids in protein, transcription of DNA to mRNA, followed by translation of mRNA to 
produce proteins with the encoded sequence.  It was observed that the amino acid sequence in 
a protein determines the final shape of the protein and that the shape and distribution of 
charges in the protein determines the activity and function of the protein.   It is thus possible 
in principle to predict the final shape and infer the function of a protein from genomic DNA 
sequences; currently, this is only possible when there is a homologous relationship to proteins 
of known function and shape.  However, the improvement of computational tools are likely to 
improve this ability to predict the function of proteins.   A much more detailed picture of 
pathogenesis will become available. 
 
46.  In the context of the BTWC, it is considered that intentional development of biological 
agents would become possible which might be incapacitants or might be designed so that two 
small molecules interact within a cell to result in a lethal binary biological weapon.   It was 
noted that within the next few years, proteomic tools will allow the screening of millions of 
small molecules for biological activity and in a slightly longer term, in silico design from 
genomic sequences will allow the rational identification of small molecules that interact with 
proteins.  Some of these will have the potential for misuse as chemical or biological agents -- 
recognising the scope of the reaffirmation at the Fourth Review Conference that: 
 
the Convention unequivocally covers all microbial or other biological agents or 
toxins, naturally or artificially created or altered, as well as their components, 
whatever their origin or method of production, 
 
47.  In respect of the Fifth Review Conference and its Final Declaration, it was considered 
important to reaffirm under Article I the language used at the Fourth Review Conference that: 
 
The Conference also reaffirms that the Convention unequivocally covers all microbial 
or other biological agents or toxins, naturally or artificially created or altered, as 
well as their components, whatever their origin or method of production, of types and 
in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful 
purposes.  
 
This could, as already suggested above in a parallel to the Final Declaration of the Second 
Review Conference, be followed by an explanatory sentence which might state that prions, 
bioregulators and proteins are covered  along the following lines: 
 
Consequently, prions, proteins and bioregulators and their synthetically produced 
analogues and components are covered. 
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48.  A further proposal was made that the opportunity should be taken at the Fifth Review 
Conference to make a reaffirmation in the context of Article IX of the BTWC which states 
that: 
 
Each State Party to this Convention affirms the recognized objective of effective 
prohibition of chemical weapons and, to this end, undertakes to continue negotiations 
in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the 
prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and for their destruction, 
and on appropriate measures concerning equipment and means of delivery 
specifically designed for the production or use of chemical agents for weapons 
purposes.  
 
bearing in mind that the Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference specifically 
stated that: 
 
The Conference decides that the Fifth Review Conference shall consider, inter alia, ... 
 
- The relevance of the provisions of, and the implementation of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention on the effective implementation of the Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention, duly taking into account the degree of 
universality attained by such conventions at the time of the Fifth Review 
Conference; 
 
Such a reaffirmation in the Final Declaration might usefully state that all possible chemical 
and infectious agents, natural or synthetic, are covered by the BTWC, the CWC or both.   
Additionally, the Final Declaration might invite the First Review Conference of the CWC in 
2002-3 to make a similar reaffirmation.   However, in discussion of the merits of such a 
reaffirmation, it was recognized that care would need to be taken to ensure that there was not 
an unintentional and undesirable blurring of some of the distinct differences between the 
BTWC and the CWC -- such as for example, the application of the BTWC to biological 
agents used against humans, animals and plants whereas the CWC applies only to the use of 
chemical agents against humans and animals.  Another example could be in the difference in 
the two Conventions in regard to use for law enforcement purposes.   It could be that it would 
be prudent to leave such reaffirmations by both Review Conferences until after the First 
CWC Review Conference has been held as a failure of the First CWC Review Conference to 
make the requested reaffirmation could lead to a undesirable and unintended weakening of 
the overall regime. 
 
49.  Two further topics mentioned but not explored in detail in the discussion related to 
addressing how the Fifth review Conference might reaffirm the coverage of biological anti-
material agents and of biological anti-microbial agents. 
 
Consolidation Phase of the Genomics Revolution 
 
50.  The session addressing Genomics and Information Technology was concluded by a 
presentation addressing the implication of the consolidation phase of the genomics 
revolution.  The 21st century was clearly seen as the age of functional biotechnology.   The 
challenge is to be able to predict phenotypes from genotypes.  For the industry, the challenge 
would be understanding genomic information and phenomena and thereby developing new 
medicines.   A central element in post genomics activities will be genome engineering -- 
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thereby carrying out in a few months what natural evolution takes a few years to achieve.   
The prospect would be of designing or redesigning genomes ('reverse phenomics') which 
might be used to produce a microbe with chosen properties.  In addition, vectorizing into 
simple delivery systems -- such as by the nasal route -- was likely to be further developed.   It 
was recognized that there would be vast amounts of information held on databases by 
industry which could include selection of genomic profiles for sub-populations as a route to 
better drugs for that population.   The question was asked as to whether controls are needed of 
such databases to prevent misuse as they could lead to the targetting of biological agents 
towards chosen genomic profiles or to subpopulations with long term artificial or induced 
genome tagging.   Vaccination was discussed as a possible means of human genome tagging.  
However, such targetting might be more probable for agricultural targets than for humans -- 
and animals and plants might well be perceived as key targets for biological warfare. 
 
51.  Insofar as the Final Declaration of the Fifth Review Conference was concerned, the 
language of the Fourth Review Conference relating to the apprehensions associated with any 
application resulting from genome studies would cover the recent developments.  There 
would, however, be benefits in underlining in the Final Declaration of the Fifth Review 
Conference in the Article I language the relevance of the relevant scientific and technological 
developments to animals and plants as well as to humans.   Attention was also given to the 
developments in vectorization as a delivery means and thus the potential relevance to Article 
I (b) of the Convention. 
 
Industrial Biotechnology:  The Critical Advances 
 
Receptors and Ligands 
 
52.  An overview related the advances in knowledge of receptors and ligands to the work of 
the Human Genome Project which had shown that there were some 450 G-protein coupled 
receptors in the human genome -- most with low molecular weight ligands, and about 20% 
neuropeptides and 25% orphan receptors with unknown ligands.  The latter were being 
actively studied as the receptors in the human genome are the most favoured targets for drugs.  
The overview continued with an examination of chemokine receptor antagonists.   It was 
noted that in screening of compounds there is continual flagging of toxic substances.   Insofar 
as the Fifth Review Conference is concerned, attention was drawn to control of SNP (single 
nucleotide polymorphisms) information.  As with other databases of, for example, human 
genomics and toxicogenomics, there was a potential for such information to be misused and it 
would be important to address this in the Final Declaration.   Other issues identified as being 
of relevance for the Fifth Review Conference included the creation and use of transgenic 
organisms, not microbial, which could be harmful. 
 
53.  A further presentation examined the applications of receptors and ligands of particular 
relevance to neuroscience.   This focussed on the advances in the understanding of 
bioregulators and of non-peptide receptor antagonists.  In the context of the Final Declaration 
for the Fifth Review Conference it was considered that in the Article I 'apprehensions' 
paragraph, the term "neuroscience" should be included so this would read as follows: 
 
 The Conference, conscious of apprehensions arising from relevant scientific and 
technological developments, inter alia, in the fields of microbiology, biotechnology, 
molecular biology, genetic engineering, neuroscience and any application resulting 
from genome studies, and the possibilities of their use for purposes inconsistent with 
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the objectives and the provisions of the Convention, reaffirms that the undertaking 
given by the States Parties in Article I applies to all such developments.  
 
In addition, the reaffirmation Article I language should be extended as already identified 
above to include an explanatory sentence which might state that prions, bioregulators and 
proteins are covered  along the following lines: 
 
Consequently, prions, proteins and bioregulators and their synthetically produced 
analogues and components are covered. 
 
54.  Further discussion related to the possible inclusion in the Final Declaration of the Fifth 
Review Conference of language reaffirming that the BTWC, unlike the CWC, does not have 
any exclusion for law enforcement purposes.   Although at first sight such a reaffirmation 
appears attractive, consideration has to be given to whether proposing such a reaffirmation 
might have an unintended and undesirable effect if it were, for any reason, not to be 
incorporated into the Final Declaration.   On balance, there appears to be greater benefit in 
following the precedent of the previous Final Declarations and reaffirming in Article I that: 
 
The Conference also reaffirms that the Convention unequivocally covers all microbial 
or other biological agents or toxins, naturally or artificially created or altered, as 
well as their components, whatever their origin or method of production, of types and 
in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful 
purposes.  
 
together with an explanatory sentence, as at the Second Review Conference, as proposed in 
the previous paragraph. 
 
Immune System Research 
 
55.    An overview brought out the immense benefits that are increasingly becoming available 
from developments in biotechnology such as antibody engineering and antibody arrays.   
Another presentation examined the way in which immunomodulators could be used for the 
control and treatment of some emerging viral infections.   The recent Australian publication3 
on genetically modified mousepox was discussed at some length and led to consideration of 
the desirability of monitoring research and development.   It was noted that in developed 
countries the requirements for the health and safety of those working with dangerous 
pathogens required the carrying out of risk assessments and, in some cases, the submission of 
such risk assessments to national health and safety authorities.  The Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety would see an extension of such risk assessments for genetically modified organisms 
around the world.   There was also discussion on the ethical considerations related to carrying 
out research which might lead to dangerous consequences.  It was noted in this context that in 
Japan in the aftermath of the Aum Shinrikyo attack on the Tokyo subway using sarin in 1995, 
major steps had been taken in education in Japan to emphasise the importance of ethical 
considerations.   In Canada, a university had introduced an ethical decision making course for 
all graduate students.  It was also noted that university departments are becoming much more 
interdisciplinary with chemistry departments recruiting microbiologists and microbiology 
departments recruiting chemists. 
                                                 
3Ronald J. Jackson et al, Expression of Mouse Interleukin-4 by a Recombinant Ectromelia Virus Suppresses 
Cytolytic Lymphocyte Responses and Overcome Genetic Resistance to Mousepox, Journal of Virology, Vol 75, 
No 3, pp.1205-1210, February 2001. 
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56.  In the context of the Fifth Review Conference, the mousepox incident underlined the 
importance of the language on Article IV in Final Declarations which emphasised the 
importance of inclusion of information about the BTWC and its provisions in textbooks and 
in scientific, medical and military education programmes.   The observation was also made 
that there would be real benefits if Japan and Canada were, when submitting information for 
the Fifth Review Conference on the national implementation of the BTWC, to include 
information on the developments made in education in Japan following the Aum Shinrikyo 
incident and on the ethical decision making courses in Canadian universities respectively. 
 
57.  The importance of including "neuroscience" in the apprehensions paragraph of Article I 
as proposed above was underlined.    It was also suggested that there would be benefits in the 
Final Declaration of the Fifth Review Conference addressing the benefits that are becoming 
available from biotechnology in the context of several Articles: Article I (basic prohibition), 
Article VII (assistance) as well as Article X (technical cooperation) by language along the 
following lines: 
 
 
 
Article I 
 
The Conference notes with satisfaction that relevant advances in the fields of 
microbiology and biotechnology have significantly increased the capability for 
protection against the hostile use of biological agents and toxins. 
 
Article VII 
 
The Conference notes with satisfaction that relevant advances in the fields of 
microbiology and biotechnology have significantly increased the ability of States 
Parties to come to the assistance of a State Party should the Security Council decide 
that such State Party has been exposed to danger as a result of  violation of the 
Convention. 
 
Article X 
 
The Conference notes with satisfaction that relevant advances in the fields of 
microbiology and biotechnology have vastly increased the potential for cooperation 
between States to help promote economic and social development, and scientific and 
technological progress, particularly in the developing countries, in conformity with 
their interests, needs and priorities. 
 
Drug Development and Design 
 
58.   An overview presentation examined information flow in an eukaryotic cell showing the 
relationship between DNA in the genome, the messenger RNA in the transcriptome and the 
proteins in the proteome which together made up the metabolome.   The new technologies 
such as combinatorial chemistry, rational drug design and high throughput screening use 
bioinformatics to accelerate discovery and development;  however, clinical trials cannot be 
accelerated significantly if safety is to be assured and such trials are thus the choke point in 
drug development.   It was observed that chemical drugs or chemically synthesized antibiotics 
are being to some extent replaced by biological drugs, produced by living cells.  However, 
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some human biological drugs, such as certain cytokines, have no animal analogies which 
makes animal trials of dubious value -- and thus providing another choke point in 
development.   
 
59.  In discussion, there was debate as to whether the rate of change in the life sciences was 
evolutionary or revolutionary with the argument being made that historically the term 
"revolutionary" has been applied to developments which with the benefit of hindsight are 
much more evolutionary in nature.   It was clear that a particular current advance in the area 
of life sciences was through the application of computation and IT -- bioinformatics. 
 
60.  In the context of the Fifth Review Conference, there was discussion about the 
significance of different terminology -- genomics, transcriptomics, proteomics, 
metabolomics.   It was noted that there would be advantage in using "life sciences" in the 
apprehensions paragraph rather than an ever lengthening listing of particular areas of science 
so the language might read as follows: 
 
 The Conference, conscious of apprehensions arising from relevant scientific and 
technological developments, inter alia, in the life sciences in animals and plants as 
well as humans, and the possibilities of their use for purposes inconsistent with the 
objectives and the provisions of the Convention, reaffirms that the undertaking given 
by the States Parties in Article I applies to all such developments.  
 
One difficulty posed by the listing approach --  microbiology, biotechnology, molecular 
biology, genetic engineering, bioinformatics, neuroscience and any application resulting 
from genome and proteome studies and derived techniques, and biological control -- is that it 
is impracticable to drop one term at a later date as this could be interpreted as meaning that 
the developments in that particular area were no longer important.   There was much to be 
said for a broader term such as "life sciences" in this paragraph.  If it was felt desirable to also 
include some of the terms seen as being significant at the time of a particular Review 
Conference, this might be achieved by the addition of an explanatory sentence to the 
'apprehensions' paragraph in a similar way to the explanatory sentence elaborating on the 
reaffirmation of the agents covered by the BTWC.   Such an explanatory sentence might be 
along the lines of: 
 
Consequently, biological control, genomics, proteomics, bioinformatics and 
databases and their applications are covered. 
 
Drug Delivery 
 
61.  An overview was presented of the particular application in drug delivery of relevance to 
the BTWC.   This examined the state of the art in molecular and particle vectors and noted 
that these were being developed for use both by the intravenous and the oral routes.  Insofar 
as vectors in gene therapy are concerned, six families of viruses are being examined as 
vectors.  It was evident that much effort is currently being put into vectors as a means of drug 
delivery as the prospects are huge and promising. 
 
62.  In discussion about the Fifth Review Conference, there was debate about the desirability 
of language relating to the delivery systems for drugs.  It was recognized that there is room 
for confusion between "vectors" as normally used in the context of biological weapons and 
"vectors" as used in drug delivery systems.   There could well be benefit for extended 
understandings being included in the Article I language in the Final Declaration of the Fifth 
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Review Conference.   It was, however, noted that the language in Article I (b) of the BTWC 
relating to delivery systems: 
 
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to 
develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:  
 
(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or 
method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for 
prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; [Emphasis added] 
 
(2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or 
toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.  
 
contains no qualifying clause as there is in Article I (a) -- and consequently, any language 
crafting an extended understanding of the language in Article I (b) has to be careful to avoid 
any weakening of the prohibition.    
 
63.  It was, however, noted that the Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference 
included language in respect of Article I that addressed open air releases.  This stated that: 
 
The Conference notes that experimentation involving open-air release of pathogens 
and toxins harmful to man, animals or plants that have no justification for 
prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes is inconsistent with the 
undertakings contained in Article I. 
 
This had applied a qualifying clause similar to that in Article I (a) to the subject of 
experimentation involving open-air release, which provided a precedent which might usefully 
be extended at the Fifth Review Conference to include both vectorization and biological 
control by language along the following lines: 
 
The Conference notes that biological control, vectorization and experimentation 
involving open-air release of pathogens and toxins harmful to man, animals or plants 
that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes is 
inconsistent with the undertakings contained in Article I. 
 
Issues of Particular Relevance for the Review Conference 
 
64.  In a final presentation a personal appreciation was presented in which the key points that 
had emerged during the Workshop were brought together with a focus on the potential 
implications for the Fifth Review Conference and how its Final Declaration might address the 
new scientific and technological developments of relevance to the BTWC. 
 
65.  This was followed by a round table in which four of the participants at the Workshop 
gave their appreciation of the key issues relating to new scientific and technological 
developments of relevance to the Fifth Review Conference.  The key issues identified were 
the following: 
 
a.  The potential for misuse of the biological characteristics of specific populations led 
to concerns about the potential for misuse of information held in databases, genetic 
profiling and targetting. 
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b.  The potential for misuse is probably greater for animals and plants (especially in 
monocultures). 
 
c.  Developments in delivery systems 
 
d.  Overlap with the CWC -- and the importance of ensuring that there are no gaps -- 
and equally no clashes between the two Conventions and thus no ambiguities or 
differences in standards. 
 
e.  Article X where the countering of infectious diseases remains the basic problem 
facing States Parties. 
 
f.  Article IV which needs to be taken forward so as to educate the scientific 
population and find some way of ensuring that misuse is prevented. 
 
g.  Concerns are common to all -- it is not only governments who are responsible.  It is 
also individual scientists, industries and companies.  There is a real need to 
promulgate to the world the message that misuse is totally prohibited. 
 
h.  The Final Declarations of the Review Conferences need to be brought to 
international attention.  Individual States Parties should consider publication of the 
Final Declarations in scientific journals or in special supplements. 
 
i.  Data bases needed to be addressed as it was important to avoid exploitation of the 
knowledge base for prohibited purposes. 
 
j.   The developments in science and technology -- such as genomic tagging, genomics 
technologies, neurosciences, bioregulators and databases -- all need to be addressed as 
all have great potential for misuse. 
 
k.  Delivery devices and biocontrol also need to be addressed by the Fifth Review 
Conference. 
 
66.  A subsequent more general discussion examined the ways in which the prohibitions of 
the BTWC and the reaffirmations of the successive Review Conferences might be made more 
generally available to both the scientific and technical community and to the public at large 
around the world.   In other words, how to raise awareness?   There was an extensive 
discussion in which a number of points were raised: 
 
a.  There was much variation between States parties in the public awareness of 
biological weapons and their total prohibition. 
 
b.  The desirability of making the background science and technology developments 
papers much more widely available through posting on the web in the six official UN 
languages as these could then be referenced by journals such as Science and Nature. 
 
c.  It is important to be clear as to what message is to be communicated to the media. 
 
d.  The term "deliberate disease" could well be better understood by the general public 
than the term "biological weapons". 
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e.  There would be benefits from idiot-proof press releases and an abundance of 
information.  However, the capacity for the press to get things wrong or to 
sensationalise issues would remain a problem. 
 
f.  A proactive approach was preferable to the more usual reactive approach of 
governments. 
 
Conclusions  
 
67.   The Workshop addressing the scientific and technological developments of relevance to  
the BTWC and their implications for the Fifth Review Conference was a stimulating, 
challenging and thought provoking event which enabled all present to consider some of the 
key issues relating to the Fifth Review Conference to be held in Geneva on 19 November to 7 
December 2001.   A number of issues -- intent, the genetically modified mousepox 
experiment, the possibility of ethnic/genetic weapons, the potential for misuse of both public 
and private databases, the merging of chemistry and biology, and the importance of education 
and ethical decision making -- recurred during the Workshop.  These considerations -- and 
many others -- informed and focussed debate on the scientific and technological 
developments, their potential for misuse and thus the desirability of language in the Final 
Declaration of the Fifth Review Conference addressing particular developments.  
 
68.  The Workshop participants developed their appreciation that the language relating to 
scientific and technological developments in Article I in the Final Declaration had previously 
comprised a reaffirmation of the scope together with an explanatory sentence and an 
apprehensions paragraph with its listing following the words inter alia of  particular broad 
areas.   A separate sentence addressing experimentation involving open-air release of 
pathogens and toxins provided a precedent that might be extended to address relevant related 
developments such as biological control and drug vectorization which both involve open-air 
release.   Initial ideas saw the extension of the listing of areas in the apprehensions paragraph 
which started with that in the Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference: 
 
The Conference, conscious of apprehensions arising from relevant scientific and 
technological developments, inter alia, in the fields of microbiology, biotechnology, 
molecular biology, genetic engineering and any application resulting from genome 
studies, and the possibilities of their use for purposes inconsistent with the objectives 
and the provisions of the Convention, reaffirms that the undertaking given by the 
States Parties in Article I applies to all such developments.  
 
and was gradually extended by additional terms: 
 
The Conference, conscious of apprehensions arising from relevant scientific and 
technological developments, inter alia, in the fields of microbiology, biotechnology, 
molecular biology, genetic engineering, neuroscience, bioinformatics and databases, 
and any application resulting from genome and proteome studies and derived 
techniques, and biological control in animals and plants as well as humans, and the 
possibilities of their use for purposes inconsistent with the objectives and the 
provisions of the Convention, reaffirms that the undertaking given by the States 
Parties in Article I applies to all such developments.  
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This led to the appreciation that an ever longer listing could be impracticable.  It would be 
preferable to use a broad term "life sciences" in the apprehensions paragraph which could be 
accompanied by an explanatory sentence concerning particular recent developments: 
 
The Conference, conscious of apprehensions arising from relevant scientific and 
technological developments, inter alia, in the life sciences in animals and plants as 
well as humans, and the possibilities of their use for purposes inconsistent with the 
objectives and the provisions of the Convention, reaffirms that the undertaking given 
by the States Parties in Article I applies to all such developments. Consequently, 
biological control, genomics, proteomics, bioinformatics and databases and their 
applications are covered. 
 
 
Key Points 
 
69.  Key points from the Workshop included: 
 
1.  Participants who were expert advisers to delegations to the Review Conference are 
encouraged to consider the desirability of their State Party submitting, as invited, 
information on new scientific and technological developments relevant to the 
Convention for inclusion in the background paper to be prepared for the Review 
Conference. 
 
a.  Such information could usefully address a single issue.  There was no 
requirement to survey the whole field. 
 
b.  Several papers presented to the Workshop could form the basis for State 
Party submissions of information on new scientific and technological 
developments:  the papers on biocontrol and plant inoculants and microbial 
genomics were two examples. 
 
c.  State Party submissions of information on new scientific and technological 
developments should address their applicability to all Articles of the BTWC -- 
not solely Article I. 
 
d.  Developments in education relating to ethical decision making in Japan and 
Canada would be useful information for sharing with other States Parties 
through inclusion in either information submitted by States Parties on the 
national implementation of the BTWC or in the new scientific and 
technological developments of relevance to the BTWC. 
 
e.  The target date for submissions by States Parties to reach the Secretariat in 
Geneva is 15 August 2001. 
 
2.   The reaffirmation language on Article I in the Final Declaration could usefully 
build upon that adopted at the Fourth Review Conference together with an 
explanatory sentence as at the Second Review Conference to read as follows: 
 
 The Conference also reaffirms that the Convention unequivocally covers all 
microbial or other biological agents or toxins, naturally or artificially created 
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or altered, as well as their components, whatever their origin or method of 
production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for 
prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes. Consequently, prions, 
proteins and bioregulators and their synthetically produced analogues and 
components are covered. 
 
3.  The apprehensions paragraph from the Fourth Review Conference could usefully 
be broadened through the inclusion of the term "life sciences" as follows: 
 
 The Conference, conscious of apprehensions arising from relevant scientific 
and technological developments, inter alia, in the life sciences in animals and 
plants as well as humans, and the possibilities of their use for purposes 
inconsistent with the objectives and the provisions of the Convention, 
reaffirms that the undertaking given by the States Parties in Article I applies 
to all such developments.  
 
Consideration might also be given to addition of an explanatory sentence if it was felt 
necessary to confirm that certain developments were included: 
 
 Consequently, biological control, genomics, proteomics, bioinformatics and 
databases and their applications are covered. 
 
4.  Consideration might also be given to extending the language in Article I relating to 
experimentation involving open-air release: 
 
The Conference notes that biological control, vectorization and 
experimentation involving open-air release of pathogens and toxins harmful to 
man, animals or plants that have no justification for prophylactic, protective 
or other peaceful purposes is inconsistent with the undertakings contained in 
Article I. 
 
5.  Language relating to scientific and technological developments could usefully be 
considered for other Articles of the Convention -- notably, Article IV (national 
implementation), Article VII (assistance) and Article X (technical cooperation). 
 
6.  Participants who were expert advisers to delegations to the Review Conference are 
encouraged to consider possible forms of language for inclusion in the Final 
Declaration of the Fifth Review Conference as this will enable informed debate 
between delegations in preparing submissions of language for the Final Declaration. 
